
























Across a series of seminal works, Ruth Millikan has produced a compelling and comprehensive 
naturalised account of content. With respect to linguistic meaning, her ground breaking approach 
has been to analyse the meaning of a linguistic term via the function it performs which has been 
responsible for securing the term’s survival. This way of looking at things has significant 
repercussions for a number of recent debates in philosophy of language. This paper explores these 
repercussions through the lens of what is known as semantic minimalism, using the tenets of 
minimalism to draw out some questions for Millikan’s approach to the semantics/pragmatics 
divide. 
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Over a series of seminal works, Ruth Millikan has set out a comprehensive and compelling 
naturalised account of representation, which explains the representational content of linguistic 
signs via the same basic biological (teleological) mechanisms that she holds explain all forms of 
intentionality. The sheer breadth and scale of Millikan’s account is extremely impressive and her 
way of looking at linguistic signs is appealing, however getting clear on exactly what her account 
predicts for core issues in the philosophy of language is not always easy. Thus in what follows I 
want to try to provide a route through some of these issues, using an alternative approach (that of 
so-called ‘minimal semantics’, Borg 2004, 2012) to help orient discussion. The suggestion is that 
approaching Millikan’s work from this perspective will help to highlight how her approach relates 
to some much-discussed issues around the semantics/pragmatics boundary, while also bringing 
into focus a potential lacuna in the account. For, as we will see, approaching things in this way 
highlights the close explanatory circle between three key notions in Millikan’s work: linguistic signs, 
linguistic functions, and domains, and raises the question of whether there is really sufficient 
independent individuation of these elements to allow the account to make a robust ruling on the 
kinds of cases that have exercised so many in recent philosophy of language. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows: §1 provides a brief overview of Millikan’s approach 
to linguistic meaning. Then, in §2, I introduce minimalism via four core tenets. The rest of the 
paper then uses those four tenets to explore Millikan’s account of linguistic meaning: §2.1 deals 
with meaning and intentions, §2.2 explores the nature and prevalence of context-sensitive 
expressions, §2.3 turns to recent issues at the semantics/pragmatics border, and §2.4 looks at 
propositions and compositionality. I conclude by suggesting that while there are several points of 
affinity between Millikan’s view and minimalism, there is a substantive difference when it comes to 
                                                          
* This paper was written for a symposium in honour of Ruth Millikan, on the occasion of her receipt from the Royal 
Swedish Academy of Sciences of the Rolf Schock Prize for Logic and Philosophy 2017. I’m grateful to Peter Pagin and 
others in the Philosophy Department at Stockholm for organising such a great event, to those at the symposium for 
insightful comments and discussion, and, in particular, to Ruth (for help with this piece but also of course for her 
insightful and inspirational work). 
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questions about where to draw the semantics/pragmatics border and, related to this, what the 
bearers of semantic content might be.1  
 
1)  Millikan’s naturalistic view of linguistic meaning 
 
Millikan aims to provide a thoroughly naturalised account of meaning in general.2 Hence her 
account is designed to apply to all forms of representation, whether in thought or in language. So 
her starting point is that language use is to be explained by the same kind of teleological 
mechanisms that explain the rest of the biological life of the organism. This starting point 
immediately puts her at odds with other influential ways of approaching language (most obviously, 
it is in tension with a Chomskian approach). To see this, consider some of common philosophical 
assumptions about the fundamental nature of language: 
 Language is governed by rules. 
 Meaning is in the mind. 
 A univocal term in a public language is associated with a psychological state common to all 
competent users. 
Millikan, however, denies all of these common assumptions. Instead, according to her: 
 Language is governed by probabilistic, conventional correlations.  
 Contra Chomsky there are public languages and the function of public language is 
communication about worldly states (like perception, language provides a route to 
knowledge of the external world).3 
 There is no guarantee of psychological homogeneity. External reference is what surfaces in 
meaning, not thoughts. 
So, instead of starting an exploration of language by focusing on what we might have in our heads 
that enables language use (making philosophy of language a branch of individual psychology), 
Millikan starts from the perspective of public signs and the practices that have led to those signs’ 
survival and proliferation. According to Millikan, language is governed not by strict deterministic 
laws but by conventional correlations between signs and what they signify. The central norms of 
language are like the norms of function and behaviour that account for the survival and 
proliferation of biological species. Thus what makes a linguistic sign meaningful is that it has a 
purpose that is (sometimes) realised by pairs of speakers and hearers, and that uses of that sign re-
                                                          
1 I suspect that at the heart of the worry I am going to raise is a deeper worry that the core explanatory notion that 
Millikan relies on – that of ‘what something is selected for’, or ‘what function is responsible for something’s survival’ – 
doesn’t extend properly from the biological realm to the linguistic. However, rather than levelling this charge directly, 
I’ll approach the issue somewhat obliquely, through discussion of the relationship between signs, functions and 
domains. 
2 See, for instance, Millikan 2005. 
3 Typically but not universally, for we can and do talk about psychological states. 
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occur due to the precedent set by past uses. For a sign to have a conventional purpose, then, is just 
for that sign typically to recur with that use on account of precedent (2004: 141).  
 The conventions in question are not (contra Dretske) strict regularities since language 
forms are often used by speakers for irregular purposes and hearers often fail to complete 
conventional patterns (they don’t believe what they are told, don’t do as they are directed). Specific 
linguistic forms survive and are reproduced together with cooperative hearer responses because, 
enough of the time, these patterns of production and response benefit speakers and hearers. To 
make this more concrete, we might ask what it is that makes the English language sign ‘dog’ about 
dogs? The answer is that there is a conventional practice of using this kind of sign to communicate 
things about dogs, and it is this practice that is responsible for the continued use of the sign. For, 
as Millikan notes (2004: 25): 
 Consider [for example] a speaker whose purpose in using the word ‘dog’ is to communicate about or call 
 attention to facts that concern dogs…Such a speaker will eventually stop trying to use the word ‘dog’ for this 
 purpose if there is no evidence that it ever has this effect on hearers. Similarly a hearer whose language-
 understanding faculties turn his mind to dogs with the purpose of collecting info about dogs whenever 
 speakers use the word ‘dog’ will soon unlearn this response if speakers never use the word ‘dog’ such that it 
 carries information about dogs.  
 
 What we need, then, to explain the intensional content of a linguistic sign is not some 
unexplained meaning entity or some kind of appeal to the thoughts that might accompany 
production of that sign, rather we need to look to the shared, community practices of using certain 
signs to communicate information about the world. On Millikan’s naturalised model, we should 
replace the intensional schema [‘X’ means Y] with talk of the purpose (i.e. linguistic function, or 
what Millikan sometimes terms ‘stabilizing cooperative function’) of X/Y, where linguistic 
functions are functions that have been of interest to both speakers and hearers on enough 
occasions that a practice has been sustained in which speakers sometimes use the forms for that 
purpose and hearers sometimes respond to the forms in the required way. Importantly, we should 
note that functions are tied to domains, i.e. to parts of the world where the signs perform the 
function in question. This is easiest to see with respect to Millikan’s discussion of the use of bird 
tracks as a sign of the presence of that kind of bird (what she terms a ‘natural sign’). So a particular 
set of tracks might mean (i.e. have the purpose of indicating) pheasants relative to one forest, A, 
where the tracks are reliable indicators of the presence of pheasants. However, in another forest, B, 
where there are both pheasants and partridges making tracks which viewers happen to find 
indistinguishable, then, relative to domain B, the very same track will have the purpose of 
indicating [pheasant or partridge]. And as for bird tracks, so for linguistic signs. Thus one and the 
same type of sign can have different purposes, and hence mean different things, relative to 
different domains.  
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 This realisation has important repercussions for what we take the bearers of semantic 
content to be, for, perhaps contrary to an unreflective assumption, it is clear that these bearers 
cannot be type words (where these are individuated by phonetic or typographical features). This 
has to be the case since two tokens with the same surface form can have different stabilizing 
functions (e.g. homonyms, or proper names, see 2004: 134), while two tokens with different 
surface forms can have the same stabilizing functions. An example of the latter kind surfaces with 
respect to referential uses of descriptions, as Millikan 2004: 153 notes: 
 Compare ‘that book over there with the blue cover’ with ‘the book over there with the blue cover’, placed in 
 the same context. These two do not seem to differ in meaning or way of functioning. 
 
So, instead of type level phonetic or typographic objects, instead it seems that stabilizing functions 
(and thus semantic content) will attach to phonetic/orthographic types relativized to a domain, for 
it is within a domain that a given expression type acquires a specific purpose. As she writes: “the 
central idea is that there is a historically positioned domain to which the sign is bound” (2004: 35). 
So for example, with proper names, we might hold that: 
i. ‘Jeremy’ is a locally recurrent sign for Jeremy Bentham within the domain 
[discussions of Utilitarianism]. 
ii. ‘Jeremy’ is a locally recurrent sign for Jeremy Corbyn within the domain [UK 
politics in 2018]. 
One and the same surface type expression (‘Jeremy’) but two different purposes relative to two 
different domains. Or again: 
i. ‘the dog’ is a conventional sign for dogs within the domain [English speakers]. 
ii. ‘the dog’ is a conventional sign for Fido within the domain [my pets].4 
Again, then, working out what purpose attaches to a surface-level sign (and hence working out 
exactly what sign we are dealing with) requires an appeal to a specific domain within which a 
specific purpose is realised.  
 Obviously there is much more that could be said about Millikan’s biosemantics in general 
and its application to linguistic signs in particular. However I hope this gives enough of an outline 
of her approach to allow us to begin to explore its repercussions. As noted at the outset, I want to 
approach Millikan’s view through the lens of an alternative approach to semantic theorising – that 
of so-called ‘semantic minimalism’ (argued for in Borg 2004, 2012, amongst other places). There 
are three reasons for doing this. First, I think that approaching things in this way may help to draw 
out some of the finer points of Millikan’s view of linguistic expressions, that might otherwise get 
                                                          
4 See Millikan 2004: 134-5, also Millikan: 2017 (p.173 in draft): “The ‘Hit me!’ said to request a card while playing 
blackjack is not the same construction as the ‘Hit me’ used to request an assault”. 
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swamped by issues about representation in general. Secondly, I take it that a robust, naturalised 
account of content would be a nice thing for a semanticist to have, so it is interesting to ask 
whether someone who signed up to a minimal approach to semantics could also embrace a 
Millikan-style teleological approach to linguistic meaning in general. Finally, however, I’m going to 
argue that approaching Millikan’s account from the perspective of minimalism highlights a 
potential lacuna in the account, concerning the relationship between Millikan’s core explanatory 
notions of sign, function, and domain. So, in the next section, I want to introduce four tenets that 
I’ve used elsewhere (Borg 2012) to characterise minimal semantics and then use these tenets to 
shape the exploration of Millikan’s approach. 
   
2) Millikan and Minimalism 
 
In other works, I have defended an approach to semantic theorising I’ve called ‘minimal 
semantics’. (Minimal, in part, because of the minimal job description it gives to semantics –
specifically while a semantic theory should explain things like compositionality and systematicity, 
and certain limited judgements about expressed content, it should not attempt to explain the vast 
majority of our judgements about what a speaker communicates by her utterance.) Minimalism, as I 
construe it, is defined by four claims: 
(MS1) Semantic content for well-formed declarative sentences is propositional content. 
(MS2) Semantic content is fully realized by lexico-syntactic content; there is nothing got ‘for free’ 
at the semantic level. 
(MS3) There are only a limited number of lexicalized context-sensitive expressions in natural 
language.  
(MS4) Recovery of semantic content is possible without access to current speaker intentions 
(crudely, grasp of semantic content involves ‘word reading’ not ‘mind reading’). 
Minimalism thus belongs with other formal approaches to semantics, where sentences, relativized 
to contexts (to accommodate the contribution of unarguably context-sensitive elements like tense 
markers, demonstratives and indexicals), are the bearers of semantic content (rather than token 
utterances) and where the contextual contribution to this semantic content is kept to a minimum 
(for discussion of exactly what ‘a minimum’ here amounts to, see Borg 2012). The natural enemies 
of minimalism, then, are a range of contemporary views (such as indexicalism, contextualism, 
relativism, and Travis-style occasion-sensitivity; for an elaboration of these views, see Borg 2012) 
which predict a much more pervasive role for context. According to these latter views the central 
task of semantic theorising is to capture our intuitions about communicated content (often 
couched in terms of our intuitions about ‘what is said’), and this intuitively communicated content 
often (perhaps always) requires a rich appeal to the context of utterance. So, for instance, the 
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speaker who says ”Jill got married and had children” intuitively (usually) communicates that [Jill got 
married and then had children], while the utterance “Naoki is tall” might communicate that [Naoki 
is tall for a 12 year old] in one context but some quite different proposition (e.g. [Naoki is tall for a 
jockey]) in another. To capture these judgements about communicated content we clearly need to 
appeal to a context of utterance (to Naoki’s age, or gender, or occupation, etc., depending on the 
circumstances of the utterance) and thus non-minimalist views suggest that the contribution of 
context to content must be allowed to range much wider than things like reference determination 
for overt indexicals and demonstratives. If we are to properly capture semantic content 
contextualists maintain that we must allow that context contributes to semantic content in ways 
that go far beyond that allowed for in (MS1-4). In particular, most non-minimalist accounts suggest 
that we must countenance ‘free pragmatic effects’: modulations of content which occur due to 
features of the context of utterance but which are not demanded by anything in the lexico-syntactic 
form of the sentence produced. 
 So, where does Millikan’s view stand with respect to this kind of debate? Does she side 
with the more minimalist picture or is her position better viewed as aligned with non-minimalist 
approaches? I want to suggest that the picture here is complicated as in fact her approach cross-
cuts some of the core issues in play (and hence that it is instructive about the ways in which the 
various elements that are debated can hang together). However, on perhaps the most fundamental 
issue – the possibility of free pragmatic enrichment or modulation – Millikan’s view seems to be 
non-minimal.5 However I’m going to suggest that (assuming that this is right) it opens up a 
potential worry with the account, for allowing free pragmatic effects makes pressing the question 
of how we identify the stabilising function of an expression and (related to this) how finely or 
otherwise we carve the domains within which expressions have their functions. For without a 
robust, independent answer to these questions there is a worry that the account will lack the 
resources required to give a decisive answer on some of the core examples highlighted in the 
minimalism/contextualism debate.   
 To see this, in the next section I want to work through each of (MS1-4), exploring how 
Millikan’s approach stands with regard to it. I’ll work through the commitments in reverse order, 
beginning with MS4, as that is where there is, I think, most optimism for consensus between 
Millikan and minimalism, and I’ll end by looking at MS1, which seems to be a genuine anathema to 
Millikan’s approach. 
 
2.1) Meaning and intentions (MS4) 
                                                          
5 At least, that seems to be the view in her 2004, but it is much less clear that it is the view in her most recent book, 
Beyond Concepts. One question then might be whether the view is simply somewhat unclear in earlier work or whether 
Millikan has changed her mind across the two works. 
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For Millikan understanding language is a form of direct perception of the world: just as I can get 
the information that the dog is in the garden by looking out the window, so I can get this 
information by being told it. What language gives us is another informational route to the world 
and it is worldly reference that figures in specifications of meaning, not the thoughts occurring in 
another person’s head. (MS4) chimes with this (anti-psychologistic) approach to semantic content, 
maintaining that semantic content is about world-invoking truth-conditions. This claim – that the 
mental states of the current speaker are not constitutive of semantic content – seems to be a strong 
point of consensus between Millikan-ism and minimalism, and a point where both the views 
perhaps diverge from more contextualist approaches (though it is hard to generalise about the 
relationship between non-minimalist approaches and speaker intentions; Travis, for instance, 
although he thinks a rich appeal to context, incorporating free pragmatic effects, is necessary, 
doesn’t think this will go via speaker intentions). 6  
 We should note, however, that a serious repercussion of adopting a general anti-
psychological stance for semantic content is that it makes an account of demonstrative reference 
difficult: to work out what a token utterance of ‘this’ or ‘that’ refers to (and hence what 
contribution it makes to the truth-conditions of the utterance in which it occurs) it seems natural to 
think that we need to appeal to what the speaker intends. What makes the dog’s expression, rather 
than the dog’s collar or colour, the referent of my token utterance of ‘That’s pretty’ is that I 
intended to refer to the dog’s expression rather than its collar. Yet this obvious move seems to be 
ruled out by any account that treats speaker intentions as otiose when determining semantic 
content. Millikan’s response to this worry (2004: 134) is, I think, to appeal to the domain on which 
a speaker is focusing (where obviously this notion of ‘focus’ must itself be non-intentional, cashed 
out instead in terms of things like eye-direction, topic of conversation, objects in the environment, 
etc). However opponents might wonder whether this approach can really meet the challenges 
posed by those, like Predelli 1998, who have argued so vociferously against the possibility that non-
intentional criteria decide demonstrative reference. I won’t pursue this point here, beyond noting 
that both Millikan-ism and minimalism will owe a satisfactory account of apparently intentional 
aspects of linguistic meaning, such as determining the reference of a demonstrative. 
 
2.2) Context-sensitive expressions? (MS3)  
 
                                                          
6 See Travis 2008. The claim that current intentions are otiose in fixing semantic content also surfaces in recent 
arguments that we cannot fix so-called ‘explicature’ content – the level of somewhat pragmatically enhanced content 
that is commonly held to yield what a speaker says or asserts – by appeal to the mental states of speakers or hearers; see 
Borg 2016, 2017. Note that Millikan 2017 denies that there is a special level of ‘what is said’ content, making do with 
just two kinds of content – semantic content and implicature content. 
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Minimalism is committed to the idea that not all, or even almost all, expressions in a natural 
language are semantically context-sensitive (this claim serves to differentiate minimalism from what 
I’ve termed ‘indexicalist’ approaches, like that of Stanley 2002, which maintain that all or almost all 
expressions have hidden, syntactically marked contextual variables as part of their logical form). 
Millikan, I think, holds the contrary view that all terms are context-sensitive. She writes “There is 
no way of adding to a local sign so as to completely free it from context”, 2004: 43. However the 
kind of context-sensitivity she has in mind is not more indexicality per se, but things like: 
identifying to which language a token belongs, what purpose a token is being put to in context, and 
making implicit reference to features of the domain (e.g. she holds that location is often implicitly 
represented by signs). This is just to emphasise, however, that it is conventional use within a 
domain that fixes content, and I think that this shifts the main point of conflict to MS2, rather than 
MS3. 
Before turning to MS3 however, one additional point on the nature of unarguably context-
sensitive terms is perhaps in order, for we should note that Millikan imposes a ‘knowing which’ 
condition on demonstratives (2004: 57), whereby speakers and hearers have to know which object 
they are talking about to use/understand expressions like ‘that dog’ (used referentially). Arguably, 
however (see, e.g., Borg 2002), not all referential uses of demonstrative terms (where we are 
individuating what it is to be a demonstrative by surface form) meet such a constraint. For uses of 
so-called ‘deferred demonstratives’ seem acceptable even where speaker and hearer are not in a 
position to identify the particular object of conversation in any substantive way. So, for instance, if 
I point at a book and say ‘That author is my favourite’ it may be that I have no way to identify the 
person picked out by the demonstrative expression except via the description ‘the author of that’. 
Or again, if we are having a discussion about the fathers of children in a school year group it seems 
I might point at a child and say ‘I’ve never met that dad’, where there is no requirement that 
speaker or hearer have non-descriptive identifying knowledge of the father in question. Perhaps, 
then, when used in these kinds of ways Millikan would prefer to treat tokens of ‘this F’ or ‘that G’ 
as having a descriptive semantic content (since there seems to be no difference in function in these 
contexts between saying ‘that author is my favourite’ and saying ‘the person who wrote that book is 
my favourite’). If this is right, then we would have another instance of a surface form type 
(‘this’/‘that’) which embodies (at least) two different functions (a referential and a descriptive 
function) and thus which is ambiguous between two distinct semantic types.  
 
2.3) The semantics/pragmatics border (MS2) 
 
Millikan acknowledges that not all uses and not all meanings qualify as part of the semantic content 
of a sign. As she writes 2004: 26-7: 
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 The functions of conventional language devices considered as such are memetic purposes. But when language 
parts are used in figures of speech or used as bases for Gricean implicatures, the underlying memetic 
purposes of these expressions are crossed by the speaker’s purposes. Then what the speaker means may not 
be what the words mean, or it may be more than what the words mean. The very same expression token then 
has two purposes derived from two different sources that cross, a literal meaning deriving from its function in 
the public language and a pragmatic meaning deriving from the speaker’s purposes. Public language meaning 
and speaker meaning often diverge in this way. 
 
The study of semantics, then, is the study of what is conventional in language use (public language 
meaning), while pragmatics involves the study of what is conveyed in ways not yet hardened into 
convention (speaker meaning). This makes the semantics/pragmatics divide one of degree: 
 Once you grasp that for a usage to be conventional is just for it typically to recur on account of precedent, the 
 debate about what is ‘said’ (conventionally signified) versus only pragmatically ‘implicated’ takes on a clearer 
 meaning. But it also becomes clear why the line is vague. Transition from nonconventional use to 
 conventional is a gradual, largely statistical matter (2004: 141)….Figures of speech, implicatures, and other 
 forms of usage [that] are slowly moving from being entirely innovative, through being somewhat familiar, to 
 being handled automatically without parsing or derivation of meaning from compositional structure (2004:  
 145).7 
 
Yet how, we might wonder, does this model of the semantics/pragmatics divide (where what is 
semantic concerns regular function, relative to a domain, while what is pragmatic concerns what is 
innovative and original) play out with respect to the particular kinds of cases that have so exercised 
recent writers in this area? There seem to be two worries with the proposal. First, we might worry 
that characterising semantic content purely in terms of ‘content regularly conveyed on account of 
precedent’ moves wholesale a range of cases often treated as pragmatic into the semantic realm 
(where this move may be thought to fit uncomfortably with other kinds of evidence). Second, there 
is a worry that the ruling the account will give for certain specific cases of potential pragmatic 
enrichment of semantic content remains unclear. I’ll consider these two points in order. 
 The first worry is that there are many statistically very common, regular uses that theorists 
nevertheless have often claimed to be instances of pragmatic, speaker meaning. So, for instance, 
take Grice’s infamous category of conventional implicatures (see Grice 1989), where, e.g., an 
utterance of ‘A but B’ is held to be semantically equivalent to something like ‘((A&B) & (this 
combination of properties is unusual))’. On Millikan’s preferred way of carving things up though, 
the very idea of a conventional implicature – of a pragmatically conveyed content which is reliably 
communicated whenever the expression is used – is simply impossible. If an utterance of ‘but’ 
conventionally conveys an element of comparison or tension then this element must constitute part 
of the signs semantic content. Of course, we might think that ruling out conventional implicatures 
is reasonable, given their tendentious nature (see Bach 1999), but there are also other, potentially 
more worrying cases. So consider Grice’s category of ‘generalised conversational implicatures’, 
where the most famous instances involve ‘scalar implicatures’ (such as using the term ‘some’ to 
                                                          
7 See also 2017 (draft: 181): “The semantics/pragmatics distinction [may be] indefinite, in various degrees, over a 
significant portion of any language”. 
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convey not the logical content ‘some and possibly all’ but the more refined content ‘some and not 
all’).8 Generalised conversational implicatures do, it seems, ‘typically recur on account of precedent’ 
(as Millikan’s definition of conventional usage above demands), but is this sufficient to make them 
semantic?  
 Well, it seems there are at least some reasons to think not, since locating these effects as 
part of the semantic content of the sign seems problematic in light of other kinds of evidence. For 
instance, amongst young children (even those who are in the process of acquiring a language from 
speakers who typically do use scalar terms to convey their enriched readings) the tendency is to 
give scalar expressions an unenriched, logical reading. So, for instance, children hearing a sentence 
like ‘Emile is wearing a hat or a scarf’ tend to judge the sentence true when Emile is shown wearing 
both a hat and a scarf (showing that children tend to interpret the scalar term ‘or’ as having its 
logical reading ‘A or B or both’), whereas adult English speakers exposed to the same prompt in 
the same context tend to judge the utterance as false (revealing that they are interpreting ‘or’ with 
the enriched scalar reading ‘A or B and not both’).9 So, treating scalar terms as having a semantic 
content that incorporates their enriched readings seems to fit poorly with acquisition data. Looking 
at conventional use amongst children, it seems that a scalar terms like ‘some’ should be taken to 
mean ‘some and possibly all’, whereas looking at adult English speakers, it seems that ‘some’ means 
‘some and not all’. However, given Millikan’s view that functions attach to surface forms relativized 
to domains, we might think that her theory has the resources to cope with these kinds of findings. 
For perhaps we should simply allow that English has two different signs, with two different 
functions and thus two different meanings: there is the child-English ‘some’ used to convey the 
logical meaning, and the adult-English ‘some’ used to convey the enriched meaning. Whether or 
not this kind of move would be admissible within Millikan’s framework is, I want to suggest, not 
entirely clear and the reason for this is that it is unclear whether this is a legitimate way of carving 
up domains. Furthermore, this question – about how fine-grained domains are allowed to be – 
becomes more pressing when we turn to consider the category of so called ‘free pragmatic effects’. 
 ‘Free pragmatic effects’, as noted above, are contextual contributions to content which are 
unmarked in the lexico-syntactic form of the expression and (MS2) was designed specifically to rule 
out such effects from contributing to semantic content. According to MS2, the route to semantic 
content runs along exclusively lexico-syntactic trails, so context is only relevant to semantic 
theorising where it is brought in to play by a formal element of the sentence, such as a 
demonstrative or tense marker. Contrary to MS2, however, it seems that Millikan’s approach will 
allow such effects to be semantically relevant (2004: 152): 
 Suppose that you are a surgeon and I am your assistant, and during an operation you direct ‘scalpel!’, then 
 ‘scissor!’, then ‘Suture!’ Who is to do what with the scalpel, then the scissors, then the suture, and when and 
                                                          
8 For an introduction to scalar implicatures see e.g. Horn 1984. 
9 See Papafragou & Musolino 2003, Pouscolous & Noveck 2009, Paltiel-Gedalyovich 2011. 
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 where is not lexicalized, but it is determined by the context in an entirely conventional way. Similarly if I say 
 ‘it’s raining’ the place at which I say this conventionally determines the place of the intentionally signified rain 
 For example, the following dialogue is not possible within the conventions of language (which is why it could 
 be a joke). 
 ‘It’s raining!’ ‘Where?’ ‘In Tahiti.’ 
 ‘It’s raining’, standing alone, simply is not a way you can conventionally say in English that it is raining 
 somewhere or other...Adding lexical items that hold places showing where extralinguistic context is part of a 
 sign surely simplifies matters for the interpreter rather than complicating matters.10 
 
While this doesn’t seem quite right as a claim about the conventions surrounding ‘It’s raining’ in 
English (consider a context in which we are currently in the UK but are going to Tahiti on holiday 
soon and you are reading a newspaper which contains global weather reports – in this context the 
dialogue seems perfectly possible within the conventions of English), the quote does suggest that in 
general Millikan is willing to allow that at least some free (unmarked) contextual effects are 
semantically relevant (that ‘extralinguistic context’ can be ‘part of the sign’ as she puts it). Yet, as 
with any account of this form, we now need an answer to the question of which such effects are 
semantically relevant and when. Consider some examples: 
 
Kind Utterance Conveyed content 
Completions Jill’s ready. Jill’s ready for the exam. 
Enrichments This steak is raw. This steak is undercooked. 
Loose talk It’s 2pm It’s roughly 2pm 
Particularised implicatures There is a garage around the 
corner. 
There is an open garage just 
around the corner. 
 
In each of these cases, it seems that deciding whether a use ‘typically recurs on account of 
precedent’ will depend on the question of how thinly or thickly we have sliced domains. To see this 
consider, as an example, Grice’s famous example of a particularized implicature ‘There is a garage 
around the corner’: as Grice discusses, in a context where we are dealing with a driver who has run 
out of petrol, this utterance will typically convey that there is an open garage around the corner, but 
is that then the semantic content of the sign? Well, if the relevant domain is indeed ‘out of petrol’ 
events then the answer is ‘yes’, but then we will need to allow that the surface level sign can realise 
                                                          
10 See also 2004: 134-5 for a similar claim about quantifier restriction, comparative adjectives and possessives. Also 
Beyond Concepts (2017): “The usage-based picture of language suggests that much more can be said in purely semantic, 
conventional, although idiomatic ways, hence much less may need to be improvised through pragmatics than classical 
Gricean pragmatics supposed”. (Beyond concepts, draft version p. 181). However for at least some expressions, 
Millikan’s recent line seems potentially more minimalist than the above quotes suggest, thus in 2017 (draft p.217) she 
writes: “Possessives are sometimes proffered as cases where determinate meanings must be supplied by the speaker’s 
intention. ‘Peter’s book,’ for example, might refer to a book Peter owns or carries or is reading, to one he wrote or 
bought or brought, to one he is recommending or balancing on his head, whereas its semantic content seems to 
designate merely some kind of pairing relation between Peter and a book. Following Dretske’s comment again (§15.4), 
there is nothing in what the possessive says that makes it about one of these relations rather than another….Think of 
‘Peter’s book,’ then, as meaning book bearing the pairing relation to Peter where the definite article functions just like 
‘the’ in ‘I fed the dog.’ The possessive, like the definite article, prompts the hearer to identify the more specific pairing 
or associating relation that is at its ground, a pairing relation being talked about but not semantically identified”. (See 
also 2017: 220 for similar comments on incomplete definite descriptions and quantifier restriction.) 
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a myriad of different functions across a myriad of different domains. For instance, we will need to 
recognise at least the following domains:    
 
Utterance There is a garage around the corner. 
Domain 1: English There is a garage around the corner. 
Domain 2: Out of petrol There is an open garage relatively near around the corner which sells petrol. 
Domain 3: Village facilities There is garage around the corner within the village limits. 
 
 As with the question above of whether ‘some’ means ‘some and possibly all’ or ‘some and 
not all’, it seems we will get different answers about what counts as semantic and what counts as 
pragmatic content depending on how we individuate signs (and the functions they perform), but to 
do this we need an independent individuation of domains. Is the domain for an utterance of ‘There 
is a garage around the corner’ [English], [petrol-seeking events], [unleaded-petrol-seeking-events-
amongst-UK-drivers], [reasonably-priced-unleaded-petrol-seeking-events], or what? Millikan’s 
model is, I think, that functions individuate signs, and domains individuate functions, but if this is 
right then we need to know what individuates domains (and it better not be signs or functions). 
Without an answer to this question it is not possible to predict what ruling the account will make 
on the kinds of controversial cases of potential pragmatic enrichment which have so exercised 
theorists in this area. The concern here is, at heart I think, a worry about whether or not the notion 
of ‘conventional function’ is one which is robust enough to yield determinate semantic content. 
Type level expressions will have a range of functions which might count as their conventional 
function (thus individuating their semantic content) depending on how thickly or thinly we carve 
out the domain to which the expression is bound: tied to English as a whole, ‘some’ conventionally 
seems to express ‘some and possibly all’, tied to adult-English it seems to conventionally express 
‘some and not all’; tied to petrol-seeking events ‘there is a garage around the corner’ conventionally 
conveys that the garage is open, tied to village-facility domains, it doesn’t. So we can only answer 
the question ‘what is the semantic content of ‘there is a garage around the corner’?’ once we know 
what the domain for any particular token of this type of sign is, but by whom, or what, and how, is 
this domain fixed?11 
                                                          
11 We might think that Millikan’s avowed commitment to the vagueness of the semantics/pragmatics divide can help 
here. For it seems that one might claim that, if there is no fixed answer to the question of the precise conventional 
function that an expression is playing, then there is simply no fixed answer to the question of its semantic content. So 
whether this given token of ‘there is a garage around the corner’ semantically conveys that the garage is open or only 
pragmatically implies this is simply underdetermined. However, allowing this kind of move seems to threaten to 
undermine some of our basic linguistic distinctions, such as that between lying or misleading, and may cause problems 
upstream, e.g. concerning how speakers acquire a language in the first place (see Borg 2017 for further discussion of 
these kinds of issues). 
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 Finally, it seems that the questions we are grappling with here also resurface (in a slightly 
different form) with respect to MS1, so let’s turn to this final tenet from minimalism now. 
 
2.4) Propositions and compositionality (MS1) 
 
Millikan advocates semantic holism, whereby the meaning of an expression is fixed by its place in a 
whole sign system. However, if we combine this holism with her stated commitment to:  
 (a) meaning is linguistic cooperative function  
And combine this with the view that: 
 (b) functions attach to signs relativized to domains 
Then I think we are likely to run once again into issues concerning how to deliver determinate 
content for signs. To see this let’s look at an example representation: 
 
(S) The mother bird is stimulated to release food by the sight of the hungry baby’s mouth. 
 
To determine the semantic content of S we need to know what its the stabilizing function is (i.e. 
the function performed by the expression which is responsible for its survival and proliferation), 
but here, at least prima facie, there seem to be multiple possibilities for the content (S) could 
represent or conventionally carry, such as: 
i. The mother bird is stimulated to release food by the sight of the hungry baby’s mouth. 
ii. The mother bird is stimulated to release food by the sight of the place where food needs 
to be put to maximise chances of off-spring survival. 
iii. The mother bird is stimulated to release food by the sight of a concave space in a 
chick’s face. 
This kind of indeterminacy of content seems fine with genuinely biological signs (whether the 
mother bird is being stimulated by the baby’s mouth or by the concave space in a chick’s face 
seems unimportant from the point of view of survival of the species), but more troubling with fully 
intensional signs. For the sentence (S) it seems clear that we want to deliver (i), rather than (ii) or 
(iii), as the content of (S). Yet for a holistic theory to yield (i), instead of (ii) or (iii), we need the sign 
system to which S belongs to include other instances of the same sign elements that (S) contains. 
For in that case we can use familiar holistic methods to constrain the meanings of the parts of the 
sentence. So, for instance, it would turn out to be a mistake to translate ‘baby’s mouth’ as ‘concave 
space in a chick’s face’ as, although this translation would work for (S), it would yield the wrong 
results for other sentences which also contain this sign, such as (S*): 
(S*) The mother put the dummy back in her baby’s mouth. 
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Yet now the worries of the previous section resurface again, for we need to know what it is for two 
signs to be the same. We know that on Millikan’s account it is not surface level sameness that 
matters (i.e. not orthographic or phonological form), so what is to stop someone holding that, say, 
the token of ‘baby’ in S, S*, or S** (e.g. “The baby wants a nap”) are just different signs in different 
domains and as such can simply have different functions? For holistic constraints to get a purchase 
we have to be able to hold signs constant across different occasions of use involving different 
contexts, but the worry is that nothing in Millikan’s account yet shows how we can type signs in a 
way that allows holistic constraints to get a purchase. We need an objective account of domain, or 
function, to stop things being carved up too finely, but again it is not immediately clear where this 
objective notion of proper function or actual domain will come from. 
 
3) Conclusion 
To conclude, there can be no question about the power or scope of Millikan’s philosophical vision. 
Her ground-breaking work holds out the promise of a unified, naturalistic account of content 
covering representation in all its forms. This is surely something we’d very much like and which it 
is clearly very hard to deliver. In undertaking this vertiginous work, Millikan’s account promises a 
novel take on many core issues in philosophy of language, and it is clear that much is to be learnt 
from trying to connect debates which often reside solely in philosophy of language with a larger, 
overarching account such as Millikan’s. However, on the flip side, getting clear on exactly how her 
approach maps to certain contemporary views is not always easy. Thus in this paper I have tried to 
spell out her view with respect to the on-going debate between minimalists and contextualists. 
Doing so, I have argued, highlights a potential question about how we are to individuate the 
bearers of semantic content on Millikan’s view. For Millikan, they are not words (typed by phonetic 
or typographic features) but rather expressions as they realise conventional functions. However, as 
reflection on Grice’s example of ‘there is a garage around the corner’ showed, a communicative 
function is conventional or not only relative to a domain. So ascertaining what function an 
expression conventionally performs (and hence its semantic content) will require a robust account 
of how the domain to which a token of this expression is bound is individuated. Yet, while the 
individuation of a domain seems relatively easy for natural signs, I have suggested that it is much 
less transparent for linguistic signs. What approaching Millikan’s philosophy from the perspective 
of minimalism highlights, I think, is that, if we want a ruling on issues around the 
semantics/pragmatics divide, we may need to know more from Millikan about how the 
individuation of a triumvirate of crucial notions – sign, function and domain – actually comes 
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